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Summary—Three studies investigating differences in people's appraisals of 
worry and anxiety situations are presented. First, data from a study by Reisen-
zein and Spielhofer (1994) were reanalyzed. Second, two further studies were 
conducted to replicate the findings of the reanalysis and to explore whether 
any additional appraisal dimensions were relevant for a differentiation of 
worry and anxiety situations. In sum, results showed that appraisals associated 
with situations in which worry and anxiety were experienced differed on eight 
appraisal dimensions. Compared to experiences of anxiety, experiences of 
worry were more often associated with positive self-evaluation, positive 
social-relationship evaluation, feelings of closeness, and sentiments of impor-
tance, and less often associated with feelings of inferiority. Moreover, in 
worry experiences, focus was often not on the self, but on other persons. Fi-
nally, with respect to temporal dimensions, worry situations were less often 
associated with notions of suddenness and momentariness than anxiety situa-
tions. Implications of these findings are discussed with respect to models of 
emotional appraisal and research on worry and generalized anxiety disorder.  
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Introduction 
With the publication of the third, revised edition of the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R; American Psychiatric Associa-
tion, 1987), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) became an independent diag-
nostic category within the canon of anxiety disorders. The cardinal criterion 
for a diagnosis of GAD was chronic, excessive, and uncontrollable worry. 
Whereas anxiety was held to be common to all anxiety disorders, worry was 
specific to GAD. Thus, the DSM-III-R established worry as an important dif-
ferential criterion for clinical assessment. Prior to this, however, there was 
considerable debate about the value of differentiating worry from anxiety. 
Some investigators suggested that worry was merely the cognitive component 
of anxiety, meaning that a separate investigation of worry was, at best, unnec-
essary (e.g., O'Neill, 1985a, 1985b). Others suggested that worry showed 
characteristics different from anxiety, meaning that a separate investigation of 
worry was, at least, valuable (e.g., Borkovec, 1985; Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). This debate has since died down. GAD was re-
tained as an independent diagnostic category in the DSM-IV (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994), and worry became a major research topic in its 
own right (for a recent review, see Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998).  
Nevertheless, the question of exactly how worry differs from anxiety 
has remained largely unexplored, with only few studies focusing on this as-
pect. A potential reason for this may be that the two phenomena show consid-
erable overlap on both the conceptual and the empirical level. The most fre-
quently cited definition of worry is that of Borkovec et al. (1983), according to 
which "worry is a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and 
relatively uncontrollable. The worry process represents an attempt to engage 
in mental problem solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but con-
tains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes" (p. 10). Whereas this 
definition makes no direct reference to anxiety, other definitions do link worry 
to anxiety, describing worry as anticipatory anxiety (Butler & Mathews, 1987) 
or anxious apprehension (Barlow, 1988). MacLeod, Williams, and Bekerian 
(1991) were thus able to summarize the common characteristics of worry defi-
nitions as follows: "Worry is a cognitive phenomenon; it is concerned with 
future events where there is uncertainty about the outcome, the future being 
thought about is a negative one, and this is accompanied by feelings of anxi-
ety" (p. 478). The most frequently cited definition of anxiety is that of Spiel-
berger (1972), according to which "the term 'anxiety' is perhaps most com-
monly used in contemporary psychology to denote a palpable but transitory 
emotional state or condition characterized by feelings of tension and appre-
hension and heightened autonomic nervous system activity" (p. 24). Whereas, 
in this definition, it is not entirely clear that the term "apprehension" denotes 
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worry, later definitions of anxiety have been more explicit in this regard. In 
Krohne's (1996) comprehensive review of anxiety research, anxiety is defined 
as "an affective state of the organism, characterized by heightened activity of 
the autonomous nervous system as well as self-perception of arousal, the 
feeling of tenseness, the experience of threat, and increased worry" (p. 8; own 
translation). With definitions of worry making reference to anxiety and vice 
versa, it comes as no surprise that there is also substantial overlap between the 
two phenomena on the empirical level. Measures of worry and anxiety have 
shown to be closely related across empirical studies, with correlations usually 
in the range of .50 to .80 (e.g., Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; 
Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992).  
Nevertheless, there is a growing body of findings indicating that, despite 
apparent conceptual and empirical overlap, worry and anxiety can be differen-
tiated. This was first shown by Davey and associates, who demonstrated that 
worry and anxiety displayed different correlation patterns once the substantial 
overlap between the respective measures was controlled for (Davey, 1993; 
Davey, Hampton, Farrell, & Davidson, 1992). In their studies, Davey et al. 
presented participants with measures of habitual worry, trait anxiety, and ways 
of coping. In line with previous findings, worry and anxiety were highly cor-
related. Furthermore, both showed negative zero-order correlations with adap-
tive ways of coping. However, when partial correlations were computed to 
control for the overlap between worry and anxiety, a different pattern 
emerged: while anxiety still displayed negative correlations with adaptive 
ways of coping, worry now displayed positive correlations with problem-
focused coping, affective regulation, and active cognitive and behavioral cop-
ing. Davey et al.'s seminal findings demonstrated that—once the considerable 
overlap between worry and anxiety has been taken into account—self-reports 
of worry and anxiety show specific characteristics and unique relationships 
which may go undetected when zero-order correlations only are inspected. 
Thus, as also shown by other research groups (e.g., Nitschke, Heller, Imig, 
McDonald, & Miller, 2001; Stöber & Joormann, 2001), it is indeed possible to 
differentiate between worry and anxiety when the overlap between the two 
concepts is statistically controlled for.  
The aim of the present research was to further investigate potential dif-
ferences between worry and anxiety, but by taking a different approach. In-
stead of investigating correlations associated with self-report measures of 
worry and anxiety, we examined situational appraisals associated with situa-
tions in which participants had experienced worry and anxiety. Applying 
methods from cognitive emotion research, we investigated whether or not 
situations in which worry was experienced (worry situations) were associated 
with different patterns of appraisal than situations in which anxiety was expe-
rienced (anxiety situations). According to cognitive theories of emotions, ap-
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praisals play a crucial role in all emotional experiences. Specifically, such 
theories hold that (a) different emotions are associated with specific apprais-
als, (b) these appraisals are "composed" of a limited number of features, and 
(c) these features can be organized into a limited number of dimensions (e.g., 
Frijda, 1986; Orthony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 1988; for a compre-
hensive review, see Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990). Consequently, if worry 
and anxiety constitute different emotional experiences, they should show dif-
ferent patterns of appraisal. 
As yet, however, only two studies on emotional appraisal have included 
both worry and anxiety. Moreover, neither study provides clear evidence 
about the potential differences between the two. The first study (Scherer, 
1993) combined worry and anxiety in a single emotion category "anxi-
ety/worry" and thus did not provide separate appraisal patterns for the two 
phenomena. The second study (Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994, Study 3) did 
investigate worry and anxiety separately. However, the authors provided only 
summary information that was too aggregated to allow for a detailed compari-
son of worry and anxiety (see pp. 60-61).1 Therefore, in Study 1, we first re-
analyzed Reisenzein and Spielhofer's (1994) worry and anxiety data. Then, in 
Study 2, we explored whether any additional appraisal dimensions showing 
differences between worry and anxiety situations could be identified. Finally, 
in Study 3, we aimed at a replication of the Study 1 findings, including two 
additional appraisal dimensions that had emerged from the results of Study 2.2 
                                                 
1Reisenzein and Spielhofer translated the German emotion term Besorgnis with "apprehen-
sion." The more common translation of Besorgnis, however, is "worry" (Krohne, 1996; 
Schwarzer, 1993; Stöber, 1995). Consequently, we will use "worry" throughout this article 
when referring to Reisenzein and Spielhofer's findings on "apprehension." 
2As one anonymous reviewer pointed out, there are different approaches to the question of 
how to demonstrate differences between certain emotions: approaches based on covaria-
tions between situational appraisals (using continuous rating scales) and approaches based 
on patterns of situational appraisals (using nominal rating scales). Both approaches have 
produced cumulative and valuable evidence to research on emotions, and ideally should 
complement one another. Still, in line with the previous studies including worry and anxiety 
(Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994; Scherer, 1993), we will concentrate on the second type of 
approach. 




In their study, Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994) recruited a sample of 30 par-
ticipants, all of them students at the University of Vienna and native German 
speakers. For each of 30 different emotions (including worry and anxiety), 
participants were asked to recall an episode in which they had personally ex-
perienced the respective emotion. The recalled emotional situations were 
noted down in form of a short key phrase. Afterwards, each situation was re-
presented to the participants, with the key phrase as a reminder. Participants 
were instructed to revisualize the situation in question, and then to indicate 
their appraisal of the situation using 22 nominal rating scales. Each rating 
scale consisted of three categories: the presence of an attribute (+); the ab-
sence of an attribute or, in case of bipolar dimensions, the presence of its op-
posite (–); and the statement "not applicable/neither-nor/irrelevant" (NA). The 
NA category was the same for each scale. All 22 scales are listed in the Ap-
pendix. (For further details on the appraisal dimensions, see Reisenzein & 
Spielhofer, 1994, pp. 67-74.)  
Our reanalysis of the worry and anxiety data from Reisenzein and Spiel-
hofer's study followed a three-step procedure. First, we calculated percentages 
of NA answers for the 22 appraisal dimensions to estimate the relevance of 
each dimension (relevance = 100% minus percentage of NA answers). Sec-
ond, we calculated the frequencies of (+) and (–) answers for worry and anxi-
ety separately. From these frequencies, we finally calculated the relative per-
centages of (+) answers for worry and anxiety, and tested the differences be-
tween these percentages for significance. 
Results 
Of the 22 appraisal dimensions, six displayed a significant difference between 
worry and anxiety situations: self-evaluation, social-relationship evaluation, 
closeness, superiority, importance, and focus (see Table 1). Overall, the situa-
tions in which participants experienced worry (worry situations) received 
more favorable evaluations than the situations in which participants experi-
enced anxiety (anxiety situations). First, self-evaluation was more often posi-
tive in experiences of worry than in experiences of anxiety. Moreover, all 
three social-relationship appraisals—social-relationship evaluation, closeness, 
and superiority—showed more positive endorsements for worry situations 
than for anxiety situations. In worry situations involving a social relationship, 
participants more often indicated that they felt close to another person or expe-
rienced a positive relationship with another person, and less often indicated 
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that they felt inferior, than in anxiety situations involving a social relationship. 
In addition, participants indicated that something important happened in al-
most all worry situations. The same can be said for only half of the anxiety 
situations. Finally, with respect to nonevaluative dimensions, only the ap-
praisal of focus showed a significant difference between worry and anxiety 
situations. In most of the anxiety situations, focus was on the self. In most of 
the worry situations, it was on another person. 
Discussion 
As outlined above, worry and anxiety are closely related and show some 
overlap on both the conceptional and the empirical level. Accordingly, our 
reanalysis of Reisenzein and Spielhofer's (1994) worry and anxiety data did 
not identify any differences in most of the 22 appraisal dimensions investi-
gated. For six of the appraisal dimensions, however (self-evaluation, social-
relationship evaluation, closeness, superiority, importance, and focus), there 
were marked differences between situations in which participants experienced 
worry (worry situations) and those in which they experienced anxiety (anxiety 
situations). Compared to anxiety situations, worry situations were more often 
associated with positive self-evaluations, positive social-relationship apprais-
als, feelings of closeness, and sentiments of importance, and less often with 
feelings of inferiority. Moreover, the focus in worry situations was often on 
others, whereas the focus in anxiety situations was almost exclusively on the 
self. In sum, the present findings suggest that the experience of worry may 
differ considerably from that of anxiety, particularly with respect to evaluative 
appraisals about the self and others (see General Discussion). 
Although the differences we identified were substantial (with the excep-
tion of self-evaluation, all differences were significant with p < .01), some 
questions remained open. First, due to the exploratory nature of this first 
study, no specific hypotheses were stated prior to data analysis. Some signifi-
cant differences may therefore have resulted from inflation of alpha error as-
sociated with the large number of significance tests. Second, Reisenzein and 
Spielhofer's sample contained only 30 worry and 30 anxiety situations. With 
so few cases, statistical power was rather low, particularly for the appraisal 
dimensions with a high percentage of NA endorsements. Therefore, some dif-
ferences may have gone undetected. Third, the 22 appraisal dimensions were 
only a subset of the 25 appraisal dimensions Reisenzein and associates had 
identified in their previous studies (Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990, 1993; 
Reisenzein & Spielhofer, 1994, Study 1 and 2). Three dimensions had been 
discarded by Reisenzein and Spielhofer because they were found to be irrele-
vant for most of the emotions under examination. These previous studies did 
not include worry, however, and some of the discarded dimensions may in-
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deed be relevant for the differentiation of worry and anxiety, while some of 
the retained dimensions may be irrelevant. 
To address these questions, two further studies were conducted. The 
primary aim of Study 2 was to explore whether appraisal dimensions not in-
cluded in Study 1 were relevant for worry and anxiety situations. A secondary 
aim was to explore whether any appraisal dimensions were irrelevant. The 
primary aim of Study 3 was to replicate the results from Study 1 with a larger 
number of worry and anxiety situations. A secondary aim was to explore if, 
with greater statistical power, further differences between worry and anxiety 




A sample of 20 participants (10 female) was recruited. To obtain greater 
variation in worry and anxiety situations and appraisal dimensions, we in-
cluded both students (from the Free University of Berlin) and non-students 
(friends and acquaintances of the second author). Mean age was 30.1 years 
(SD = 4.8). Students participated in exchange for two hours of extra course 
credit. All participants were native German speakers.  
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed individually. The interview and rating procedure 
closely followed the procedure that Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994, Study 2) 
used to elicit appraisal dimensions. The interview consisted of two parts. In 
the first part, participants were asked to recall three situations in which they 
had experienced worry (but not anxiety) and three situations in which they had 
experienced anxiety (but not worry). The reason for including only "pure" 
situations was that—in analogy to the partial correlations applied by Davey et 
al. (1992; Davey, 1993)—we wanted to control for the overlap between worry 
and anxiety. The sequence of recollection of situations was balanced: Half of 
the participants first recollected worry situations and then anxiety situations; 
for the other half, the sequence was reversed. Each situation was condensed 
into a short key phrase (e.g., "Money problems" or "Walking home alone at 
night") which was written on a card to serve as a memory aid in the second 
part of the interview. In the second part, participants were presented with the 
nine possible paired combinations of the three worry and the three anxiety 
situations. The sequence of combinations was randomized. For each combina-
tion of one worry and one anxiety situation, participants were asked to gener-
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ate an attribute in which the two situations differed. Overall, this procedure 
resulted in a total of 20 (participants) × 9 (attributes per participant) = 180 at-
tributes. 
Coding of Attributes  
The 180 attributes were independently coded by the authors, using Reisenzein 
and Spielhofer's (1994) coding system. This system comprised the 22 dimen-
sions displayed in Table 1, as well as goal-conduciveness, difficulty, and in-
terestingness (for a detailed description of all dimensions, see Reisenzein & 
Spielhofer, 1994, pp. 67-74). Although the 25 dimensions presumably com-
prised, either literally or in analogy, all dimensions mentioned in the literature 
on emotional appraisals, we also looked out for additional dimensions. To 
make full use of the data, we followed Reisenzein and Spielhofer's (1994) 
suggestion that complex, ambiguous, or otherwise problematic attributes could 
be given a second coding. This was the case for 31 attributes (17%). Congru-
ent codings, either first or second choice, were obtained for 130 attributes 
(72%). To assess interrater agreement, chance-corrected agreement of our 
codings was computed separately for each category using conditional kappa 
(Hubert, 1977).3 With an average kappa of .73, interrater agreement was satis-
factory.  
Results and Discussion 
First, we checked whether any of the 22 appraisal dimensions from Study 1 
appeared to be irrelevant for the differentiation of worry and anxiety situa-
tions. A dimension was considered irrelevant if it did not receive a single 
coding from either rater. This was the case for two dimensions, namely cer-
tainty and anticipated effort. Next, we examined the codings for additional 
dimensions not included in Study 1. The only additional dimension given two 
congruent codings was goal-conduciveness. Moreover, close inspection of the 
attributes congruently coded as instability suggested that instability ratings in 
fact comprised two different aspects: the first aspect related to the changeabil-
ity of the situation, corresponding to Reisenzein and Spielhofer's (1994) ap-
praisal dimension of instability, while the second aspect related to the duration 
of the situation, corresponding to appraisals that whatever happened was either 
momentary or lasting. Consequently, we labeled this new appraisal dimension 
"momentariness." 
The results of Study 2 suggested some changes to the set of appraisal 
dimensions applied in Study 1. First, as certainty and anticipated effort seemed 
                                                 
3We would like to thank Rainer Reisenzein for valuable advice on the calculation of these 
statistics. 
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to be irrelevant to the differentiation of worry and anxiety situations, they 
could be excluded from further investigations, and goal-conduciveness in-
cluded in their place. Moreover, in searching for additional differences be-
tween worry and anxiety situations, it would appear beneficial to include mo-
mentariness as a further dimension of temporal appraisal, as a complement to 
instability (for details on the two additional dimensions, see Appendix). Thus, 
the aim of Study 3 was twofold. First, we wanted to replicate the findings of 
Study 1. In line with these findings, we expected that, compared to anxiety 
situations, individuals in worry situations would indicate more positive self-
evaluations and social-relationship evaluations (i.e., more positive social-
relationship evaluation, more closeness, more superiority), that they would 
more often indicate sentiments of importance; and that the focus would less 
often be on the self. Second, we wanted to explore if, with a larger number of 
worry and anxiety situations, any additional appraisal dimensions (including 
goal-conduciveness and momentariness) would show differences between 




A sample of 41 students (32 female) was recruited at the Free University of 
Berlin. Mean age was 25.3 years (SD = 5.1). Participants volunteered in ex-
change for one hour of extra course credit. All participants were native Ger-
man speakers. 
Procedure 
Participants were interviewed in individual sessions. Again, the interview con-
sisted of two parts. In the first part, the procedure was exactly the same as in 
Study 2: participants were asked to recall three worry-only situations and three 
anxiety-only situations. For each situation, a key phrase was noted down on a 
card to serve as memory aid. In the second part, the six cards were put in ran-
dom order. The key phrase from each card was then transferred to the top of a 
sheet containing the nominal rating scales for the 22 dimensions included (see 
Appendix). Participants were instructed to revisualize the situations they had 
experienced and then rate these situations (not the emotional experience) using 
the rating scales presented. Apart from the addition of goal conduciveness and 
momentariness and the omission of certainty and anticipated effort, the rating 
scales were the same as in Study 1. The statistical analyses also followed the 
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same procedure as in Study 1, with the exception that directional tests were 
computed for those dimensions for which hypotheses had been formulated. 
Results 
As shown in Table 2, all hypotheses were confirmed. Situations in which par-
ticipants experienced worry (worry situations) showed the predicted differ-
ences to situations in which participants experienced anxiety (anxiety situa-
tions) with respect to subjective evaluation, social-relationship evaluation, 
closeness, superiority, importance, and focus. As expected, experiences of 
worry were less often associated with negative self-evaluation than experi-
ences of anxiety. Furthermore, experiences of worry were more often associ-
ated with closeness and a positive evaluation of the social-relationship in-
volved in the situation, and less often with feelings of inferiority. Importance 
again showed significant differences: participants more often indicated senti-
ments of importance for worry situations than for anxiety situations. Finally, 
the hypothesis concerning focus also received strong support. Whereas in 90% 
of anxiety situations focus was on the self, focus in worry situations was more 
balanced. In half of the worry situations, focus was on the self, in the other 
half, it was on another person or others.  
For the dimensions for which no hypothesis had been formulated, test 
statistics were subjected to Holm's improved Bonferroni correction (Holland 
& Copenhaver, 1988) in order to conserve an error level of .05 across the 
whole set of exploratory analyses. After this procedure, two dimensions 
showed significant differences, namely suddenness and momentariness, indi-
cating that worry and anxiety situations also differ with respect to temporal 
aspects, with worry situations less often associated with suddenness and mo-
mentariness than anxiety situations.4 
                                                 
4Strictly speaking, Fisher's exact test may not be appropriate for the present analyses 
(Bortz, Lienert, & Boehnke, 1990; Siegel & Castellan, 1988). As each participant contrib-
uted more than one rating, the data are probably not statistically independent. Therefore, we 
experimented with a different statistic in order to explore whether the findings remain sta-
ble when controlling for the potential interdependencies in the data. Because each of the 41 
participants generated three worry and three anxiety episodes in this study (except for one 
participant who only generated two worry episodes, see Table 2), we could investigate the 
appropriateness of our results by aggregating endorsements across participants and then 
using pairwise t tests to test differences in the appraisal of worry and anxiety episodes as 
follows: First, for each appraisal dimension, endorsements of (+) were coded as +1, en-
dorsements of (–) as –1, and endorsements of NA as 0. Second, for each participant, a value 
"degree of (+) endorsement" was calculated by aggregating across worry situations and 
across anxiety situations separately, resulting in a data set with (independent) participants 
as the unit of analysis. MEAN was chosen as the aggregate function here, so individual 
values ranged between –1 and +1, with positive values indicating more (+) than (–) en-
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Discussion 
Whereas Study 3 corroborated all the findings of Study 1, it produced two ad-
ditional findings, indicating that worry situations were significantly less often 
associated with appraisals of suddenness or momentariness than anxiety situa-
tions. Thus, experiences of worry and anxiety also appear to differ with re-
spect to temporal appraisals (see General Discussion). We can only speculate 
as to why Study 1, the reanalysis of Reisenzein and Spielhofer's (1994) data, 
did not show these differences. With respect to the appraisal of momentari-
ness, the reason is simply that Reisenzein and Spielhofer's study included ap-
praisals of instability, but not of momentariness, and that only the latter differ-
entiate between worry and anxiety situations. With respect to the appraisal of 
suddenness, however, Study 1 used the same rating scale as Study 3. Never-
theless, the results differed markedly. We see two possible reasons for this dif-
ference. The first is related to the fact that Reisenzein and Spielhofer sampled 
"normal" worry and anxiety situations, instructing their participants to "recall 
for each of the emotions an episode . . . where they had experienced the re-
spective affect" (p. 35). Because experiences of worry are often associated 
with anxiety and vice versa, this may have resulted in some overlap between 
worry and anxiety situations, thus blurring potential differences in the ap-
praisal of suddenness. In contrast, we sampled "pure" worry and anxiety 
situations (i.e., worry-without-anxiety situations and anxiety-without-worry 
situations). This may have had the intended result of enhancing the differen-
tiation between worry and anxiety situations. The second potential reason is 
related to the fact that Study 3 was based on a larger sample of situations than 
Study 1 (i.e., 245 situations compared to 60 situations) so that, with greater 
statistical power, Study 3 was able to identify differences in the appraisal of 
suddenness. 
General Discussion 
Worry and anxiety are closely related phenomena, showing considerable 
overlap on both the conceptual and the empirical level. Nevertheless, research 
has begun to carve out differences between worry and anxiety by looking for 
variables that show different patterns of associations for the two phenomena. 
In this spirit, the present article examined patterns of situational appraisal. 
                                                                                                                                                     
dorsements, and negative values indicating more (–) than (+) endorsements. Third and fi-
nally, pairwise t tests were computed to test differences between participants' appraisals of 
worry and anxiety situations. The pattern of results was exactly the same as the pattern dis-
played in Table 2. Consequently, the fact that we used Fisher's exact test on situations that 
were not strictly independent does not seem to have any adverse impact on the results of 
Study 3. 
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Three studies were presented comparing the appraisal of situations in which 
individuals experienced worry (worry situations) with those of situations in 
which they experienced anxiety (anxiety situations). First, Reisenzein and 
Spielhofer's (1994) data were reanalyzed. Second, two further studies were 
conducted to replicate the findings of this reanalysis and to explore whether 
any additional appraisal dimensions were relevant for the differentiation of 
worry and anxiety. Overall, the results showed that for most dimensions of 
appraisal, worry and anxiety situations did not differ. Yet, for eight appraisal 
dimensions, there were marked differences. Five dimensions (self-evaluation, 
social-relationship evaluation, closeness, superiority, and importance) were 
evaluative appraisals. The other three dimensions (focus, suddenness, and 
momentariness) were nonevaluative appraisals. With respect to the direction 
of these differences, the findings converged to form the following pattern. 
Compared to experiences of anxiety, experiences of worry were more often 
associated with positive self-evaluations and positive social-relationship 
evaluations. Moreover, compared to experiences of anxiety, experiences of 
worry were more often associated with a feelings of closeness and less often 
with feelings inferiority. Importance was a further dimension in which ap-
praisals differed: more worry situations than anxiety situations were associated 
with sentiments of importance. Finally, with respect to temporal aspects, expe-
riences of worry were less often associated with appraisals of suddenness and 
momentariness than experiences of anxiety.  
The present findings may have important implications for models on 
emotional appraisal and research on worry and generalized anxiety disorder. 
Where models of emotional appraisal are concerned, they may elucidate why 
Scherer's (1993) expert system, which was based on the theoretical profiles of 
his appraisal model (Scherer, 1988), experienced difficulties in predicting 
worry and anxiety. This expert system was programmed to compare a partici-
pant's appraisals with the appraisal profiles of Scherer's model and then guess 
which emotion the participant was thinking of. Overall, the hit ratio was im-
pressive, averaging 78%. For the combined emotion category "anxiety/worry," 
however, it was only 14%. A comparison of Scherer's theoretical profiles with 
the present findings reveals that two of his specifications for anxiety/worry 
may be problematic. First, Scherer's model holds that anxiety/worry is associ-
ated with low suddenness. In contrast, our findings show that only worry 
situations were often given appraisals of low suddenness. For most anxiety 
situations, however, suddenness was indeed indicated. Second, Scherer's 
model holds that anxiety/worry is associated with a focus on the self.5 In con-
trast, our findings show that only anxiety situations are predominantly associ-
                                                 
5In Scherer's (1988) terms: concern relevance = own body/self.  
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ated with a focus on the self. In worry situations, on the other hand, focus is 
often on others. Consequently, our findings suggest that Scherer's (1993) ex-
pert system may be improved by respecifying the appraisal profile for anxi-
ety/worry or, better yet, including separate profiles for anxiety and worry.  
Where research on worry and generalized anxiety disorder is concerned, 
the present findings add further evidence to the growing body of research 
demonstrating that worry and anxiety—albeit closely related—are separate 
constructs that show some marked differences (Davey, 1993; Davey et al., 
1992; Nitschke et al., 2001; Stöber & Joormann, 2001). First, our findings 
show that worry may have more positive connotations than anxiety. Experi-
ences of worry were significantly more often associated with positive self-
evaluations than experiences of anxiety. Moreover, experiences of worry were 
more often associated with sentiments of importance. Whereas people may 
also experience anxiety in face of minor threats (e.g., a harmless spider), peo-
ple only tend to worry about major threats to their physical and psychological 
well-being (e.g., job loss), that is, threats which may affect a number of goals, 
goals of importance, or goals which cannot be realized after the event (Tallis 
& Eysenck, 1994). Moreover, research has shown that many people hold 
positive beliefs about worrying, for example, that worrying helps analytical 
thinking, motivates, and prepares for problem solving (Freeston, Rhéaume, 
Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Tallis, Davey, & Capuzzo, 1994). In fact, 
many people consider worrying itself to be some kind of anticipatory problem 
solving (Tallis et al., 1994). Moreover, worrying about something (e.g., your 
team's new project) or someone (e.g., a colleague who has felt depressed 
lately) may indicate that you are a conscientious and empathic person; and 
worrying about technological risks or about socio-political developments may 
be regarded as a demonstration of expertise (Schönpflug, 1989). Accordingly, 
the experience of worry is often associated with positive self-evaluation.  
Second, the present findings lend further support to recent theoretical 
developments that stress the importance of taking interpersonal factors into 
account when investigating worry and generalized anxiety disorder (Borkovec 
et al., 1998). In the present analyses, major differences between worry and 
anxiety situations were found for the appraisal of social relationships (social-
relationship evaluation, closeness, and superiority) and focus. In most anxiety 
situations with a social-relationship component, the respondent felt distant 
and/or inferior to another person, suggesting that these situations referred to 
incidents in which he or she was afraid of somebody. In contrast, in most 
worry situations with a social-relationship component, the respondent felt 
close and/or not inferior to another person, suggesting that these situations re-
ferred to incidents in which he or she was worrying about somebody. Whereas 
almost all anxiety situations were associated with a focus on the self, half of 
the worry situations were associated with a focus on another person. Thus, it 
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comes as no surprise that chronic worriers show elevated levels of empathic 
concern for others (Peasley, Molina, & Borkovec, 1994). In some cases, this 
concern may be so exaggerated that the chronic worriers become overly-
nurturant and intrusive in their interpersonal relationships (Borkovec et al., 
1998; Pincus & Borkovec, 1994).  
Finally, our findings indicate that events which elicit worry may also 
display a different temporal pattern than those which elicit anxiety. In line 
with formulations of worry as "anticipatory anxiety" (Butler & Mathews, 
1987), the present studies found that experiences of worry were less often as-
sociated with appraisals of suddenness and momentariness than those of anxi-
ety. The difference for suddenness was particularly pronounced. Whereas the 
majority of anxiety situations contained an element of suddenness, the major-
ity of worry situations did not. This finding may highlight another difference 
between anxiety and worry. Whereas anxiety may be a spontaneous experi-
ence elicited by sudden and immediate threats (e.g., a dog attacking), worry 
episodes are often associated with nonsudden and distal threats which the in-
dividual is aware of well in advance (e.g., end-of-term exams). A characteris-
tic of worry is that it involves planning ahead for future events, constructing 
negative scenarios of the future, and ruminating about possible negative out-
comes (Tallis & Eysenck, 1994). Consequently, many worry situations were 
appraised as lasting, whereas most anxiety situations were appraised as mo-
mentary, a finding well in line with Spielberger's (1972) definition that anxiety 
is mostly a transitory state.  
While the present findings are in accordance with conceptional and em-
pirical work on worry and anxiety, they have some potential limitations. To 
begin with, it remains unclear whether the findings on differences in temporal 
appraisals are generalizable to "normal" worry and anxiety situations. Because 
anxiety and worry are closely related, worry situations will usually contain 
some anxiety, and anxiety situations will usually contain some worry. The dif-
ference in suddenness and momentariness, however, was only found between 
"pure" anxiety and worry situations (i.e., worry situations without anxiety and 
anxiety situations without worry), whereas all other differences were also 
found in the reanalysis of Reisenzein and Spielhofer's (1994) anxiety and 
worry situations. Thus, the findings for suddenness and momentariness await 
replication with unrestricted worry and anxiety situations. Moreover, our sta-
tistical comparisons may impose some limitations on the current findings, 
since Fisher's exact test may not be appropriate for the present analyses. As 
each participant contributed more than one rating, the data are probably not 
statistically independent. However, due to the replication of the Study 1 find-
ings, the alpha adjustment for the new findings in Study 3, and the supportive 
results of the collateral parametric computations (pairwise t tests), we feel rea-
sonably confident that false-positive conclusions have been avoided. Still, fu-
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ture studies may profit from using continuous rating scales to assess appraisals 
in worry and anxiety situations. This would permit parametric tests to be used 
for repeated measures. These tests would not only control for potential de-
pendencies in the data, but provide greater statistical power for the detection 
of differences between worry and anxiety.  
Moreover, whereas the findings clearly indicate that worry and anxiety 
situations are associated with different patterns of situational appraisal, the 
appraisal patterns were obtained by aggregating across many different situa-
tions. Consequently, the extent to which the findings are also representative of 
individual worry and anxiety situations remains unclear. Research on test 
anxiety has shown that worry about test performance and evaluation is a major 
domain of worries for university students (Zeidner, 1998). However, it may be 
difficult to apply the pattern of findings related to social-relationship apprais-
als (social-relationship evaluation, closeness, and superiority) and focus to 
worries related to one's own performance. For worry in test situations, focus 
will be mostly likely on the self, rather than on others or on social relation-
ships. Students' worries are not restricted to tests and exams, however. 
Whereas research with free-recall measures of worry (Dugas, Freeston, 
Doucet, Lachance, & Ladouceur, 1995) demonstrated that most of the univer-
sity students' worries pertained to their studies (with 60-75% of students re-
porting such worries), it also emerged that students worried a great deal about 
their finances (30-39%), their intimate relationships (30-34%), and their rela-
tionships with family or friends (12-25%). Thus, worries that involve social 
relationships with intimate partners, friends, or family also constitute a fair 
share of people's experiences of worry (see also Craske, Rapee, Jackel, & Bar-
low, 1989). Nevertheless, future research on situational appraisals in worry 
and anxiety may profit from categorizing the worry and anxiety situations 
generated by participants in order to take the possibility of domain-specific 
appraisal patterns into account.  
Furthermore, critics may claim that the present findings only mirror lay-
person's everyday concepts, and have no implications for the scientific inves-
tigation of worry and anxiety. Whereas this may be a valid concern for our 
findings on anxiety, it is not the case for worry. The reason for this is that the 
scientific investigation of worry is grounded on everyday conceptions of 
worry, whereas the investigation of anxiety may rely on further data. Accord-
ing to Lang (1985), the "data of anxiety" come from three general categories 
of measurable responses, namely (a) verbal reports of distress, (b) fear-related 
behavioral acts, and (c) patterns of visceral and somatic activation. Moreover, 
the prominent self-report measures of anxiety such as the Manifest Anxiety 
Scale (Taylor, 1953) and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) 
make little or no direct reference to the term "anxiety." Instead, they have par-
ticipants answer questions across the whole range of cognitions, feelings, be-
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haviors, and somatic/physiological reactions usually associated with the expe-
rience of anxiety. Worry, on the other hand, is a genuinely private event, and 
the data on worry are drawn exclusively from verbal self-reports (however, 
see Stöber, 1998). In the scientific investigation of generalized anxiety disor-
der (GAD), researchers usually apply the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric As-
sociation, 1994) and related interview schedules (e.g., Brown, DiNardo, & 
Barlow, 1994) to arrive at, or rule out, a diagnosis of GAD. Participants are 
asked to indicate how much they worry, whether they consider their worrying 
to be uncontrollable, and whether they feel that their worrying affects their 
everyday functioning and personal relationships. Moreover, the prominent 
self-report measures of worry such as the Penn State Worry Questionnaire 
(Meyer et al., 1990) and the Worry Domains Questionnaire (Tallis et al., 
1992) are all based on direct references to the term "worry," with each item 
asking participants to give frequency, intensity, or typicality ratings for their 
worries. Thus, in both basic and applied settings, the scientific investigation of 
worry is reliant on participants' everyday conceptions of worry in much the 
same way as was the case in the studies described in the present paper. 
Finally, the present studies all involved German-speaking participants 
and their appraisals of situations in which they had experienced "Besorgnis" 
(the German term for worry) or "Angst" (the German term for anxiety). As 
language plays an important role in the study of emotions (Wierzbicka, 1995), 
the question may arise as to whether the present findings are generalizable to 
other languages. Whereas this may be problematic for languages which do not 
share the same roots as German, we are confident that the present findings will 
be generalizable to other Indo-European languages, particularly to English. 
First, German and English are closely related (cf. the German term "Angst" 
and the English term "anxiety"). Moreover, all previous findings which our 
research group has obtained from German participants responding to German 
translations of English-language worry and anxiety questionnaires have pro-
duced results comparable to those obtained with English-speaking participants 
and the original questionnaires (e.g., Joormann & Stöber, 1997; Stöber, 1995, 
1997, 1998; Stöber & Joormann, 2001; Stöber, Tepperwien, & Staak, 2000). 
However, for languages from groups other than the Indo-European family, 
such as the Asian languages, the generalizability of the present findings is 
questionable, as there may not be direct equivalents for the terms "worry" and 
"anxiety" (e.g., Imada, 1989). Therefore, in line with previous studies on the 
structure and dynamics of worry (Boehnke, Schwartz, Stromberg, & Sagiv, 
1998), it may be a worthwhile endeavor for future research to attempt a cross-
national replication of the present findings, thus affording an insight into the 
cross-language commonalties and language-related specifics of situational ap-
praisals associated with worry and anxiety.  
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Table 1 
Appraisals of Worry and Anxiety Situations: Reanalysis of Data from Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994) 
    f   
 Categorya  Worry Anxiety % of (+) ratingsb  
Appraisal dimensions (+) (–) Relevance % (+) (–) (+) (–) Worry Anxiety pc 
Evaluative dimensions       
 Subjective evaluation Positive Negative 95 4 24 0 29 14 0 .052 
 Interpersonal evaluation Positive Negative 67 5 15 5 15 25 25 1.000 
 Moral evaluation Right Wrong 50 6 11 4 9 31 35 1.000 
 Self-evaluation Positive Negative 52 9 7 2 13 56 13 .023* 
 Evaluation of others Positive Negative 45 9 6 5 7 60 42 .449 
 Social-relationship evaluation Positive Negative 58 22 2 5 6 92 46 .006** 
 Closeness Close Distant 88 22 8 5 18 73 22 < .001*** 
 Superiority Superior Inferior 53 5 8 0 19 39 0 .006** 
 Importance Important Unimportant  100 28 2 17 13 93 57 .002** 
Nonevaluative dimensions           
 Focus Self Other(s) 88 4 22 25 2 15 93 < .001*** 
 Time Present Future 80 19 6 17 6 74 76 1.000 
 Suddenness Sudden Not sudden 77 14 9 17 6 61 74 .530 
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(Table 1, continued) 
 Expectedness Expected Unexpected 82 5 20 5 19 20 21 1.000 
 Familiarity Familiar Unfamiliar 88 9 16 9 19 36 32 .780 
 Certainty Certain Uncertain 78 9 15 6 17 38 26 .534 
 Predictability of consequences Predictable Unpredictable 92 15 13 7 20 54 26 .054 
 Instability Changeable Not changeable 90 6 20 10 18 23 36 .379 
 Intentionality Intended Unintended 70 11 9 9 13 55 41 .537 
 Causality Self Else 67 3 16 8 13 16 38 .163 
 Controllability Controllable Uncontrollable 88 22 4 25 2 85 93 .420 
 Anticipated effort High Low 68 11 9 17 4 55 81 .100 
 Focality-Globality Concrete Unspecific 95 24 5 25 3 83 89 .706 
Note. 30 participants generated a total of N = 60 situations (30 worry situations and 30 anxiety situation). Each situation was rated on all 22 appraisal dimen-
sions. % relevance = 100% – percentage of NA ratings. f = frequency. 
aSee Appendix for details. bRelative percentage of positive endorsements: f(+) × 100 / [f(+) + f(–)]. cError probability of Fisher's exact test, two-tailed. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Table 2 
Appraisals of Worry and Anxiety Situations: Replication and Extension  
   f   
   Worry Anxiety % of (+) ratingsb  
Appraisal dimensionsa Hypothesis Relevance % (+) (–) (+) (–) Worry Anxiety pc 
Evaluative dimensions      
 Subjective evaluation — 91 11 100 11 100 10 10 1.000 
 Goal conduciveness — 69 23 56 20 71 29 22 .295 
 Interpersonal evaluation — 75 17 76 20 71 18 22 .589 
 Moral evaluation — 58 17 59 16 49 22 25 .843 
 Self-evaluation W > A 77 39 50 22 78 44 22 .001** 
 Evaluation of others  — 54 30 35 29 39 46 43 .729 
 Social-relationship evaluation W > A 68 53 31 39 43 63 48 .031* 
 Closeness W > A 71 43 42 30 60 51 33 .015* 
 Superiority W > A 58 22 42 5 73 34 6 < .001***
 Importance W > A 91 111 4 92 17 97 84 .002** 
Nonevaluative dimensions        
 Focus A > W 93 63 50 104 11 56 90 < .001***
 Time — 95 54 61 54 63 47 46 1.000 
 Suddenness — 94 40 76 80 33 35 71 < .001+ 
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(Table 2, continued) 
 Expectedness — 88 51 51 50 64 50 44 .413 
 Familiarity — 91 48 63 37 75 43 33 .131 
 Predictability of consequences — 93 36 78 35 78 32 31 1.000 
 Instability  — 93 72 47 68 40 61 63 .785 
 Momentariness — 87 54 48 83 29 53 74 .002+ 
 Intentionality — 86 24 79 25 83 23 23 1.000 
 Causality — 85 43 59 62 45 42 58 .027 
 Controllability —  91 31 76 19 97 29 16 .026 
 Focality-Globality —  96 98 22 84 32 82 72 .121 
Note. 41 participants generated a total of N = 245 situations (122 worry situations, 123 anxiety situations). Each situation was rated 
on all 22 appraisal dimensions. Hypothesis: W > A = Worry situations with more (+) endorsements than anxiety situations, A > W = 
Anxiety situations with more (+) endorsements than worry situations. Relevance % = 100% – percentage of NA ratings. f = fre-
quency. 
aSee Table 1 for (+) and (–) categories. Additional dimensions were goal conduciveness with conducive (+) vs. hindrance (–) and 
momentariness with momentary (+) vs. lasting (–). bRelative percentage of (+) ratings: f(+) × 100 / [f(+) + f(–)]. cError probability 
of Fisher's exact test, one-tailed if hypothesis specified, two-tailed if no hypothesis specified. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001, one-tailed. +p < .05, two-tailed (Bonferroni-corrected). 
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Appendix: The Nominal Rating Scales of Studies 1 and 3  
Evaluative Dimensions 
Subjective evaluation. In this situation, something happens … which is desirable/positive 
(+); which is undesirable/negative for me (–). 
*Goal conduciveness. In this situation, something happens … which is conducive to my 
personal goals (+); which is a hindrance to my personal goals (–).  
Interpersonal evaluation. In this situation, something happens … which others would 
evaluate positively/approve of (+); which others would evaluate nega-
tively/disapprove of (–). 
Moral evaluation. In this situation, something happens … which is right, fair, or deserved 
(+); which is wrong, unjust, or undeserved (–). 
Self-evaluation. In this situation, … I evaluate myself positively (+); I evaluate myself 
negatively (–). 
Evaluation of others. In this situation, … I evaluate another person/others positively (+); I 
evaluate another person/others negatively (–). 
Social-relationship evaluation. In this situation, … I have a positive relationship to another 
person/others (+); I have a negative relationship to another person/others (–).  
Closeness. In this situation, … I feel close to another person/others (+); I feel dis-
tant/separated from another person/others (–).  
Superiority. In this situation, … I feel superior to another person/others (+); I feel inferior 
to another person/others (–).  
Importance. In this situation, … something important happens (+); something unimportant 
happens (–).  
Nonevaluative Dimensions 
Focus. In this situation, something happens … which concerns primarily myself (+); which 
concerns primarily another person/others (–). 
Time. This situation is concerned … with something in the present/which has already hap-
pened (+); with something in the future/which has not yet happened (–). 
Suddenness. In this situation, … something occurs suddenly (+); this is not the case (–). 
Expectedness. In this situation, something happens… which I expected (+); which I did not 
expect/was unexpected (–). 
Familiarity. In this situation, something happens … which is familiar/known (+); which is 
unfamiliar/unknown to me (–). 
+Certainty. This situation concerns something … that I am certain will happen or has hap-
pened (+); that I am uncertain will happen or has happened (–). 
Predictability of consequences. In this situation, something happens … the consequences of 
which I can foresee/predict (+); the consequences of which I cannot foresee/predict (–).  
Instability. In this situation, something happens … which may change again (+); which is 
unlikely to change again (–). 
*Momentariness. In this situation, something happens … which is momentary (+); which is 
lasting (–).  
Situational Appraisal in Worry and Anxiety     25 
 
Intentionality. In this situation, something happens … which I actively tried (or try) to bring 
about or to prevent (+); which I did not (or do not) actively try to bring about or to 
prevent (–). 
Causality. In this situation, something happens … which was caused primarily by myself 
(+); which was caused primarily by somebody or something else (–). 
Controllability. In this situation, something happens … which I can (still, or again) change 
or influence (+); which I cannot (or can no longer) change or influence (–). 
+Anticipated effort. I will have to exert much effort to deal with this situation (+); I won't 
have to exert much effort to deal with this situation (–).  
Focality-Globality. In this situation, … my emotion is elicited by a concrete event (+); my 
emotion is elicited by unspecific things (–). 
Note  
Except for Momentariness, all scales are from Reisenzein and Spielhofer (1994, pp. 67-74). 
Only the (+) and (–) categories are listed. The NA (not applicable) category was the same 
for all scales. +Scales used only in Study 1. *Scales used only in Study 3. All other scales 
were used in both studies. 
